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FOREWORD: CAUSES AND LIMITS OF PESSIMISM 
STEPHEN B. BURBANKt 
No.6 
The David Berger Program on Complex Litigation has enabled 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School to serve as a partner with 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States in bringing together talented judges, scholars, and 
practicing lawyers to discuss the pressing procedural issues of the day. 
This partnership resulted in a number of meetings devoted to the 
state of practice under, and the possibilities for amending, Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing class actions. More 
recently, the success of the format led the leaders of the federal judi-
ciary's effort to reconsider the treatment of mass torts, Judges An-
thony Scirica and Paul Niemeyer, to request that I organize a group to 
t David Berger Professor for the Administration of justice, University of Pennsylva-
nia Law School. 
( 1851) 
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help map the terrain for the Working Group on Mass Torts and, after 
the Working Group issued its report,
1 
in assessing the prospects for 
reform surveyed there. 
This Symposium on Mass Torts represents part of that effort, and I 
am grateful to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for choosing it 
as their annual faculty symposium and to the editors for their help in 
making the arrangements and in shepherding the papers through the 
editorial process. All of those involved owe a special debt of gratitude 
to Ms. Rae DiBlasi, whose competent and cheerful help in this, as in 
so much over a Penn Law career spanning more than forty years, en-
sured that complicated arrangements seemed simple and allowed the 
participants to do their work efficiently and comfortably. A final word 
of gratitude is reserved for David Berger, member of the Class of 1936. 
Throughout an astonishing career at the bar, David has always re-
membered his alma mater and has always allowed the scholars his 
funds have supported to go where their research took them. 
As the readers of the contributions to this symposium will quickly 
discover, not only is there no panacea for the problems created by 
contemporary mass tort litigation, but there is widespread pessimism 
among informed participants and observers about the ability of our 
legal system to devise adequate solutions. I believe it is worthwhile to 
consider briefly the sources of such pessimism, the causes of the dis-
tress that is evident in so many of the papers that follow. My hope is 
that this exercise may help to identifY the limits of pessimism and 
hence to be realistic about reform. 
Consideration of the characteristically masterful paper by Profes-
sor Edward Cooper, which canvasses both a bold and a modest ap-
proach to the closure of mass tort claims by litigation or settlement, 
should immediately remove from suspicion as the cause of pessimism 
the lack of imagination, ingenuity, or insight.2 Rather, it appears from 
Professor Richard Marcus's friendly but probing commentary that the 
problems of mass tort litigation are polycentric, so that pressure ap-
plied in one area causes movement elsewhere,3 and that even a mod-
1 
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MAsS TORTS, 
REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS 
TORT LITIGATION]. 
2 
See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of lvlass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 
1943 (2000). 
3 
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-
409 (1978) (suggesting various ways of adjudicating claims and solving problems char-
acterized by a multiplicity of affected persons). 
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est reform may yield a cure worse than the disease.
4 
The other commentary on Professor Cooper's paper, authored by 
Chief Judge Edward Becker and Jerome Marcus, reminds us that ex-
pertise comes in many forms and that solutions to the problems of 
mass torts will require more than the best efforts of the bench.5 It is 
no criticism of a group appointed by the Chief Justice of the United 
States and working under the auspices of a committee of the Judicial 
Conference that their work has focused on legal change within the 
power of judges to effect. Indeed, one of the many useful products of 
that work has been frank recognition of the limits of judicially fash-
ioned change and the importance, therefore, of participation, if not 
leadership, from the other branches of government. Professor Coo-
per's paper is largely devoted, after all, to a statute.
6 
Still, it is fair 
comment that even the brightest group of judges and scholars of pro-
cedure may not have background in, or knowledge of, the relevant 
substantive law to devise the best solution for legislative adoption.
7 
Nearly fifteen years have passed since the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit openly acknowledged that, in the ab-
sence of help from Congress, the federal judiciary would be forced to 
stop doing business as usual in asbestos litigation.
8 
Five years after 
that, the call for both a congressional solution and, in its absence, for 
more daring judicial efforts came from a special committee appointed 
by the Judicial Conference.
9 
Congress chose to devote its efforts to 
4 See Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009 (2000). 
5 See Edward R. Becker & Jerome M. Marcus, A Response to Professor Cooper, 148 U. 
PA. L. REv. 2001 (2000). 
6 
See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1953-57. 
7 Participants in this Symposium had the benefit of a long and thoughtful paper by 
Professor David Rosenberg, who could not attend but who offered a very different ap-
proach. See David Rosenberg, Mass Production Goods, Torts andJustice (unpublished 
manuscript, copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Other substan-
tive solutions are sketched in these pages by Professor Hazard and by Professor Mul-
lenix. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1915-18 
(2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1919, 1928-30 (2000). 
8 "If Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive 
hearings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the extent enjoyed by the pro-
fession in the past." Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F. 2d 468, 4 73 (5th Cir. 1986). 
9 See REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, app. Cat 24 (noting that the 
Ad Hoc Committee called for legislative authorization for class action trials to override 
the limitations of Rule 23); Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Ju-
dicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 27-35, 36-39 (Mar. 14, 
1991) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (recommending consid-
eration of a national legislative solution and urging the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules to end its informal moratorium on revisions to Rule 23). 
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seemingly more tractable and in any event politically profitable areas 
of litigation. 10 The judiciary did entertain daring solutions in asbestos 
litigation, but they foundered on limits found in existing law, inter-
preted in the shadow of the Constitution.11 And the Chief Justice la-
12 ments. 
Perhaps we should conclude from this history that what Professor 
Richard Marcus calls "benign neglect"13 is not only (in light of the al-
ternatives) the best strategy but also the only feasible course. Perhaps, 
that is, our pessimism should reflect not only the difficulty of moving 
Congress to action, but, as Professor Geoffrey Hazard's bleak analysis 
of the so-called "futures problem" suggests,14 the barriers that the Su-
preme Court's recent class action decisions have erected5 and those 
that even Congress would confront in trying to resolve the futures 
problem. Yet, before descending to those depths of despair, one 
should consider the more optimistic view of class actions taken by 
Judge Diane Wood16 and also by Professor Linda Mullenix/' as well as 
the more optimistic views of specialists in bankruptcy, Professor Alan 
Resnick,18 and Professor Elizabeth Gibson (whose commentary seems 
to chart a course between Resnick and Hazard) .19 
Professor Resnick's and Professor Gibson's contributions may also 
suggest a strategy of incremental legislative change that, when cou-
pled with a similar strategy of judicially fashioned reforms, might yield 
some relief, if not a global solution. In any event, they have deepened 
my doubts about the wisdom and propriety of using Rule 23(b) (1) (B) 
certification instead of bankruptcy to achieve "global peace" and 
strengthened my belief that if Congress were to amend the bank-
ruptcy laws as suggested, the shadow of constitutional doubt that 
10 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737. 
11 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). 
12 See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2324 ("But the 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases,' ... 
cries out for a legislative solution.") (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
13 
Marcus, supra note 4, at 2009. 
14 See Hazard, supra note 7. 
15 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
16 See Diane P. Wood, Commentary on "The Futures Problern" by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933, 1937-39 (2000) . 
17 See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1920-22. 
18 See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy As a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening, 148 
U. PA. L. REv. 2045, 2049 (2000). 
19 SeeS. Elizabeth Gibson, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will This Vehicle Pass Inspec-
tion?, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2095, 2116-17(2000). 
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darkens Professor Hazard's paper would dissolve in the bright light of 
a democratic response to urgent practical problems.20 
Even a strategy of incremental judicial reform faces serious practi-
cal, political, and legal roadblocks. Professor Francis McGovern de-
scribes examples of cooperation in mass tort litigation within the fed-
eral judiciary and between the federal and state judiciaries, and he 
sketches a model of enhanced cooperation.21 Chief Justice Norman 
Veasey's commentary gives some hope of an invigorated state judicial 
response and participation,22 but the problems of funding and coor-
dination are surely daunting. Part of McGovern's plan calls for elabo-
ration of the relevant sections of the Manual for Complex Litigation.23 
Yet, Thomas Willging's interesting paper exposes the pitfalls of pre-
scription in that influential but not authoritative publication. 24 
Apart from practical and prudential limits to what discretionary 
judicial action can accomplish in this area, formal lawmaking by the 
judiciary quickly confronts either the limitations in the Rules Enabling 
25 Act or the need for statutory amendments. When the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged what everyone knew-that the 1966 amend-
ments to Rule 23 had important substantive consequences26-it be-
comes very difficult to make further amendments that implicate the 
availability of the class device without the active involvement of Con-
gress.27 In the present climate, it is also very difficult to see how to en-
20 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, 113 
ZEITSCHRIIT FUR ZMLPROZEB INT'L (forthcoming 2000) ("[l]t may be that the peo-
ple's elected representatives can wage peace more broadly and more effectively than 
can self-appointed representatives."). 
21 See Francis McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State judges in 
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1867, 1886-96 (2000). 
22 See E. Norman Veasey, A Response to Professor McGovern, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1897 
(2000). 
23 SeeMcGovern, supranote21, at 1895. 
24 See Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Man-
ual for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2225 (2000). 
25 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1994) (prohibiting Court rules from modifying sub-
stantive rights). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982). 
26 "[T]his Court's rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and 
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substan-
tive rights of litigants." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (footnote 
omitted). 
27 See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 13, 19 (1996) ("It may seem a paradox, but use of the Enabling Act process to 
correct its own excesses, even unanticipated excesses, is fraught with real contro-
versy."); cf Burbank, supra note 25, at 1155-57 (discussing the Court's authority to 
amend Federal Rules that incorporate statutory provisions). 
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gage Congress without sacrificing the value of political neutrality to 
which judges and their helpers in the rulemaking process aspire.28 It 
may be concerns of this sort that have led to the Chief Justice's appar-
ent "benign neglect" in response to the Working Group on Mass 
Torts' recommendations for further action, which contemplate formal 
cooperation between the judicial and legislative branches.29 
A more likely explanation of what I take to be the Chief Justice's 
pessimism has to do with other potential costs ofjudicial involvement 
in the highly charged political environment of mass torts litigation. 
Professor Judith Resnik advises us, as they say, to "follow the money."30 
She evidently believes that the judiciary could, if it were so inclined, 
rein in the practicing bar, and she sees in that prospect opportunities 
for progress in addition to the resolution of mass torts litigation.31 
Her paper is rich in insight and extremely useful in focusing attention 
on incentives. However, I share the skepticism of Judge Patrick Hig-
ginbotham as to whether the benefits of the process she would impose 
h 32 are wort the costs, and of Professor Nancy Moore as to whether the 
legal system as a whole would be well served by the judicial role in 
monitoring attorney-client relationships that Resnik's prescriptions 
would require. 33 More fundamentally, I share the view of A.A.S. Zuck-
erman that any attempt to reduce the expense of litigation can be de-
feated by the entrepreneurial ingenuity of the bar until such time as 
reformers directly alter the mechanisms by which the bar is compen-
sated.34 In this country, of course, that would require legislation.35 
28 
See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
2067, 2067-87 (1989) (arguing that "political neutrality is a central value in rulemak-
ing"). But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1935-36 (1989) (disputing Carrington's 
notions of "neutrality" and of "political"). 
29 
See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 67-70. 
30 
See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Subsidies, Fees, and Costs in Individual and Aggre-
gate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 ( 2000). 
31 
See id. at Section V.D. 
32 
See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Thoughts About Professor Resnik's Paper, 148 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2197,2204 (2000). 
33 
See Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of 
Attarney Fees and Costs in Mass Tort Litigation-A Response to judith Resnik, 148 U. PA. L. 
REv. 2209, 2215-22 (2000). 
3
' See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolfs Access to Justice: Plus Ca Change . ... , 59 MOD. 
L. REV. 773, 795-96 (1996) ("There is no alternative to a direct attack on the economic 
incentives to complicate and protract the litigation process.") . 
35 
See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Proceduml Change: Who, How, Why, and 
When ?, 49 ALA. L. REv. 221, 239 (1997). 
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"Following the money" in mass tort reform focuses attention on 
the corrosive effect that money plays not just in legislative halls but in 
the halls of justice where judges are elected. It is no wonder that the 
Chief Justice recoils from cooperative lawmaking.36 Yet, considering 
how unlikely is effective reform from Congress and how limited are 
the reforms that can come from the judiciary, federal or state-con-
sidering, moreover, that continued neglect may not be benign-we 
may need to redefine the reform landscape. Overruling Buckley v. Va-
leo's invalidation of campaign expenditure limitations37 could serve as 
an immense boon to legal reform, permitting both legislators and 
elected judges to put principle before principal and enabling the co-
operation between Congress and an independent judiciary that the 
fear of guilt by association now retards. Pessimism is a luxury we can-
not afford. 
36 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 
315, 316 (1999) ("The message that courts are engaged in partisan politics denies the 
possibility of the rule oflaw."); id. at 339 ("Some politicians and interest groups believe 
or pretend that the similarities between judges and legislators run far deeper [than the 
fact that both make law], and that the processes of government affectingjudges should 
reflect that view of reality."). 
37 
424 U.S. l (1976) . 
